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far as it goes" (515). And thence James goes on to state his pragmatic overbelief hypotheses, that is to say, those which his method—over and over again specifically mentioned—lead him to accept as true. So real, so genuinely valid for him, have a theistic, somewhat anthropomorphic, and certainly ethical interpretation become in the last chapters, that he conceives it possible "actually to help God in turn to be more effectively faithful to his own greater tasks" (519). If it was an error, therefore, in my "Mediæval Aspect" to hold that James attributed a real existence and ethical character to the Deity upon the basis of pragmatic tests his argument may be said to lend itself to such an interpretation.

With reference to Professor Sabin's distinction between real things as being and as *becoming* teleological I would beg to profess my disbelief in creation *ex nihilo*.

JOHN M. WARBEKE.

Mt. HOLYOKE COLLEGE.

SOCIETIES

AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION: ABSTRACTS
OF PAPERS BY LEADERS OF THE DISCUSSION ON
"THE NATURE OF THE COMMUNITY."

The Nature of the Community, A Defense of Philosophic Orthodoxy.

WILBUR M. URBAN.

The object of this paper is to interpret philosophically the "traditional and orthodox" conceptions of community and state in such a way as to serve as a point of reference in the discussions of the Association. An attempt is made to meet and evaluate the current criticisms of the "over-individual" and monistic theories, the underlying belief of the writer being that these proposals for reconstruction do not so much affect fundamental conceptions of community and state as the institutions and mechanisms developed for the expression of their life.

A distinction is drawn between social and political formulas as descriptions of "natural" and historical fact and as résumés of social meanings and values. Whatever be the place of such formulas in social and political science, in philosophy the question of the nature of the social order is primarily one of meaning and value. From this point of view, the traditional conceptions have not only "the advantage of ideality" (Dewey), but of essential reality. No merely realistic or instrumental conceptions, it is held, can exhibit the true nature of the social order.

The paper is divided about equally between the general con-

ception of the over-individual nature of community and the more specific monistic theory of the state. As we should expect, the criticisms of these theories fall naturally into those which deny the correspondence of these theories with actual fact, and those which deny their validity as expressions of social meanings and values. So far as the first point is concerned, a large part of current criticism is frankly accepted. The analogies of organism or over-individual self, if taken literally, both break down at certain points, but the value of these conceptions lies rather in the fact that they tell us what social reality, community, is not (e. g., an aggregate, conscious construction) rather than what it ultimately is. Much more important is it to meet the criticisms from the standpoint of "value," and here the over-individual conception maintains itself. Far from its being true, as for instance MacIver holds, that "we can not give meaning and concreteness to such a value" (over-individual mind) it is something we are constantly doing, and must do, if a large part of our ethical and legal judgments are to be valid. Far from its being true that such a mind absorbs or "makes unreal" personal and group values, the postulation of over-individual entities and structures is the very condition of their reality. From this point of view the "over-individual" has a distinct advantage over the "inter-individual" concept of community.

As is commonly recognized, the relation of the state, *communitas communitatum*, to the community is the final test of any conception of community, and the writer holds that the monistic theory, rightly understood, is implicit in communal psychology and logic, if these terms may be allowed. It is denied that such a conception involves the "illegitimate identification" of community and state or the absorption of either individual or association. On the other hand, any other conception leads to a still more doubtful identification of the state with its merely "political fabric."

A clear distinction is drawn here also between the "monistic formula" as a description of historical fact and as a résumé of social meanings and values. Current criticisms of the traditional theory of sovereignty are admitted and its fictional elements frankly recognized. But a distinction is emphatically drawn between the legal concept of *omnipotence* and the ethical concept and ideal of *omni-competence*. The latter is defined, not as ultimate authority in all things, but final authority in certain things which concern all the elements of community. Omni-competence implies the ethical character of the state in a preeminent sense, and this view is defended against current attacks. The ends of the state are indeed an ethical *minimum*, but a minimum so indispensable to the life of the community, present and future, that it must be clearly differentiated from the ends of all voluntary associations.

The main contention of the paper is that social and political formulas are by their very nature more than descriptions of historical fact. As expressions of the meaning of the social order, the traditional and orthodox formulas still represent the *sensus communis* in its deepest moments and highest reaches. The critics of these theories demand that our formulas be made to fit the facts, but among the facts to be included are precisely the meanings and values which these idealistic formulas have more or less adequately expressed.

Communal Ghosts and Other Perils in Social Philosophy. MORRIS R. COHEN. (Printed in full in this JOURNAL, Vol. XVI, No. 25, pp. 673-690.)

Community is a Process. M. P. FOLLETT.

The correspondence between the results of recent biological and psychological research and what we find in our observation of groups is a matter of the greatest importance to politics, economics, jurisprudence and ethics. From both these lines of study, that based on the individual and that based on groups, we see that community, the essential life process, is the activity of integrating. This process implies neither absorption on the one hand, nor, on the other, as the pluralists would have us believe, balance and compromise, but a genuine inter-weaving where each individual has its full part in the whole a-making. It is an all-including, self-originating, continuously-creating activity. It creates personality, purpose, will. With these appear freedom and law.

This conception of community tends to do away with some of the antagonisms which separate monism and pluralism. When Holt in his interpretation and expansion of the Freudian psychology shows us one and only one evolving process which at different stages we call matter or mind—we are on the road to a fruitful synthesis. By showing us scientifically that the integrating whole is always more than the sum of all the parts, the appearing of the new as a moment in evolution is clearly indicated. This corresponds perfectly to what we find in our study of groups: the genuine social will, or community, is always a moment in the process of integrating. The recognition that the joint action of reflex arcs is not mere reflex action, the recognition of the law of *organized* response, and that behavior is not a function of the immediate stimulus, is as important for sociology as for biology.

Moreover, to continue with the hints of synthesis, when some of the realists show us the objective as an integral part of the process of integration becoming thereby the subjective, and the subjective the

objective, the old distinction between subject and object loses its significance. In our study of the group process also we see this distinction disappearing. The functional theory of causation, too, changes much of our thought. When all taint of static ends disappears, and purpose is seen *within* the process, the true place of teleology in ethics and politics, economics and jurisprudence, is revealed to us. Again, the conception of community as never-ceasing activity abolishes the notion of hierarchy held by many of the monists and changes the pluralists' mistaken idea of unity. That the state is "supreme," "over and above," becomes a meaningless sentence; we see that there can be no over-individual mind, but only an inter-individual mind—an entirely different conception. As meaningless too becomes the pluralists' "reduction to unity." We agree with the pluralists that there can be no unity and yet we see the life process as one of continuous unifying. Spontaneous unifying is the reality for humanity. But spontaneous unifying is what the political pluralists are already urging in their advocacy of groups. And spontaneous unifying is the heart of a true monism. The activity of the pluralists' entities, the activity which is their only being, should be harmonious adjustment to one another—which is monism a-making.

But the most important result of an appreciation of the all-sufficing, all-including character of the community process is that we come to realize that it is this process which is continuously producing both society and the individual. Both idealists and pluralists put the individual outside the process: the idealists when they would have us "choose" the universal community, the political pluralists when they would have us "choose" the "nearest" group. The latter forget that the realism upon which their political science is supposed to be founded has shown us, in its interpretation of recent biological research, that the reaction is the picking out of a part of that which sets up the reaction. They forget that the self which they say chooses the stimuli is being made by reaction to these stimuli. The practical importance of this for our present political and industrial troubles (policemen's strikes, *etc.*) is obvious. The fallacy of pluralism is not its pluralism, but that it is based on an outside individual. The outside individual is the pluralist myth. The correction of this error would, I am convinced, bring idealists and realists nearer together.

And perhaps the idealists would not so strenuously object to pragmatism if the pragmatists would somewhat change their idea of testing. The weakness of pragmatism, as usually understood, is that when you "test" you test a static idea. And there are no static

ideas. Community is a process, an endlessly creative process. When we have a firmer grip on our powers, we may find it more "pragmatic" to create than to test.

The Pluralistic State. HAROLD J. LASKI.

1. Despite the great service rendered by the philosophers to political science, they have studied rather the form than the substance of the state. This has meant an undue emphasis upon purpose as distinct from the fulfilment of purpose. It has led to an analysis of the "pure instance" rather than an analysis of the actual experiments with which history presents us.

2. This is why the attitude of the philosopher has been so similar to that of the lawyer. The "rights" studied by the latter take their origin from a set of historical circumstances which the lawyer, from his standpoint naturally, is able to ignore. They differ from the study of "right"; but it is upon the latter problem that our attention must to-day be concentrated.

3. We have found that a state in which sovereignty is single is morally inadequate and administratively inefficient. For (a) it depends upon an intellectualist view of the state which is not borne out by the facts. (i) It assumes that the government is fully representative of the community. This is only partially the case. (ii) It assumes that the problems of the modern state admit of general solutions. In fact the main problem is rather the different way in which general solutions must be administered. (iii) It assumes that the voter transcends his own interest by merging himself into a larger whole, with the result that a "general will" can be secured. The truth rather is that we are confronted by a series of special wills, none of which can claim any necessary preeminence. (iv) It does not sufficiently investigate the moral character of governmental acts. (v) It does not sufficiently investigate the relation of the citizen-body as a body capable of, but rarely exercising, judgment upon governmental acts. (b) It does not see that the rules of administration are dependent upon certain psychological factors. (i) There is a law of diminishing administrative returns. An official can not be charged with business over a territory beyond a certain size without administering less efficiently for each addition to his work. (ii) No amount of efficiency at a central office will morally compensate for the inferior interest in the result obtained of those who have had no share in making it. (iii) Every monistic state is over-centralized: this, as Lamennais said, results in apoplexy at the center and anæmia at the extremities. (iv) Every monistic state is trying to apply equal and uniform solutions, *e. g.*, in education, to things neither equal nor uniform.

4. The pluralistic state is an attempt to remedy these defects by substituting coordination for a hierarchical structure. His main propositions are: (i) The allegiance of man is diverse—to state, to church, to trade-union. Where they conflict he ought to support that which his judgment suggests is right. (ii) There is therefore no such thing as the sovereignty of law in any sense which admits of practical political application. (iii) In actual fact what we meet is a variety of interests, functional and territorial, and the way in which they articulate suggests the necessarily federal character of all government. (iv) The main advantage of this federal structure is that it affords better channels for the operation of an active consent on the part of citizens than any other method. (v) This federalism must not be thought of in purely spatial terms. It applies not less, say, to the government of the cotton industry than to the government of Massachusetts. (vi) Ultimately it suggests a rough partition between the two great functions of production and consumption with a state in which supreme power is divided between the two. (vii) Where the interests of each touch upon the other some mechanism of ultimate adjustment will be needed. But the main thing is to avoid a system in which supreme power is concentrated at a single point in the body public.

5. Ultimately there is involved in this view a theory of the nature of liberty. In Mr. Graham Wallas' phrase, liberty is conceived as being the "capacity of continuous initiative," and it is suggested that this is unattainable in a monistic state upon the present administrative scale except for a small governing class. Liberty, it is argued, results from a division of forces, and the organization of a contingent system of resistances is the only way in which it can be preserved.

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The Community and Economic Groups. J. H. TUFTS.

The problem of the community in relation to economic groups is just now showing two opposing tendencies at work. On the one hand, economic power appears to be steadily gaining in effectual control over all living conditions, and in the view of some is rendering political power obsolescent. At times it is the capitalist or owner group which conspicuously exhibits this power through its

setting of prices; at times it is the labor group through an Adamson law, or a threatened shutting off of the community from food or fuel. On the other hand, such laws as the Clayton and Federal Trade Commission acts, and such decisions as Hitchman Coal and Coke Co. vs. Mitchell, and the recent injunction in the coal strike, show a tendency to restrict the powers of both economic groups.

Which control is better? The merits of political and legal control lie in the tendency toward general interests, toward equality and responsibility; its defects are its failures to deal constructively with new issues, to give a hearing to the important special interests of various groups, and to utilize for public welfare the many types of ability which majority elections do not select and which institutions that are prevailingly legal do not provide for. The merits of economic control are its greater flexibility and constructiveness, since it is unhampered by precedents or constitutions, its regard for vital interests of present life and for effective as well as formal freedom. Its defects are its devotion to special group interests, often to the ignoring of general interests, its imperfect sense of responsibility, and a somewhat one-sided emphasis upon liberty rather than justice.

REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

The Elementary Nervous System. G. H. PARKER. Philadelphia and London: J. B. Lippincott Company. 1919. Pp. 229.

This book is one of a series of monographs on experimental biology edited by Jacques Loeb, T. H. Morgan, and W. J. V. Osterhout. Its delimited field of investigation is the elementary nervous system as represented alike in lower multicellular animals and, locally, in vertebrate organisms. Professor Parker suggests the term neuromuscular mechanism to designate the subject of his researches, since in his view effectors should be included along with receptors and adjustors in any adequate conception of the nervous system in its wider meaning and relations. Indeed, in the matter of genesis his opinion is that muscle was developed antecedently to nervous tissue proper, and should be regarded as the original element in the evolving mechanism constituted, in its final phases, of cord, brain, and sense organs with all their intricate muscular, glandular and other connections. Accordingly, his study is divided into three parts in which he successively considers independent effectors, such as are found in sponges; the receptor-effector systems of cœlenterates; and lastly, in brief conclusion, the relation of elementary receptor-effector complexes to the central nervous system of higher animals. The